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Kennedy Space Center 
 
• KSC has a rich history of contributions to the programs 
that have defined US spaceflight. 
 
• Since 1981 - 135 flights & flows over 3 decades of: 
• Reusable orbiters, propulsion, engines 
• Expendable external tanks 
• Refurbishing solid rockets 
• Facilities, control centers, launch pads 
• People, integrating diverse organizations  
• Block upgrades, technology, and operations 
improvements 
• The preparation, on-ground integration, testing and 
launch of hundreds of scientific payloads, crews, and 
a Space Station 
 
• And contributing this knowledge gained to the questions 
– what’s next? What has been learned? 
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Kennedy Space Center and Reusability 
 
• The original notions of Reusability and Shuttle orbiters were about 
an operable system achieving dramatic improvements in 
operational complexity, reliability and maintainability. 
Circa 1970’s Space Shuttle reusable orbiter 
concept of operations 
For future reusable 
systems, we will apply 
abundant knowledge and 
experience. 
 
What worked… 
…and what didn’t. 
 
← What was once 
envisioned for the very 
visible technology, vehicle, 
facilities and people 
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Kennedy Space Center and Reusability 
 
• Past advocacy about having Reusable elements in a space lift 
architecture stressed long term budget benefits. 
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What’s new is old? Report of the Space Task Group-1969, 
NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History 
Office, Wash., D.C. 
Mars, Lunar…  
This future never 
happened. 
 
What would result from 
what was envisioned? 
Numerous exploration 
advances within 
unremarkable budgets. 
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KSC and the Air Force Reusable Booster System 
 
• Collaboration with AFRL has been ongoing over the last decade. 
 
• Current KSC collaboration with AFRL emphasizes: 
 
• Connecting an operational vision to traditionally non-KSC areas such 
as research and technology directions, development, and 
manufacturing/production, reusable and expendables. 
 
• Applying the knowledge and experience of working with industry 
over decades on the only operational launch system with a major 
reusable element – Shuttle orbiters. 
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KSC and the Air Force Reusable Booster System 
 
• 2010: KSC collaborated with the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) to 
develop a “CONOPS” document for the AF RBS. 
• Finding: Designing to assure the systems integrity of the vehicle 
can be maintained in normal turnaround operations was found to 
be key going forward to achieve the necessary combination of RBS 
responsiveness and cost. 
PUBLIC: Figure – Conceptual Operational Flow from the “Reusable Booster System, Concept of Operations, A Ground Systems and Ground Operations 
Analysis for Rapid Response Orbital Space Delivery”. Available to the public at the NASA Technical Reports Server, ntrs.nasa.gov. 
You can buy responsiveness, up to a 
point, beyond which buying more 
increases the risk of programmatic 
failure (due to cost). 
 
To go beyond the barriers to 
responsiveness – the AF RBS program 
is planning at inception, bringing in 
diverse operator experience. 
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KSC and the Air Force Reusable Booster System 
 
• 2011-12: KSC continues it’s collaboration with AFRL 
• Life-cycle cost modeling and analysis 
• Defining operable designs and technology 
• Overall integrating our data and knowledge into RBS planning 
• Identifying drivers of life cycle scenarios 
• Ground rules and assumptions as 
scenarios. 
• Methods emphasizing connections 
between potential actions, both 
programmatic and technical, and 
outcomes, responsiveness and 
cost. 
• Robustness through understanding 
uncertainty and context. 
Notional life cycle cost phasing scenario through a given year for a 
unique set of technical and organizational design variables. 
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The Committee’s Task 
 
• The questions of this committee about the Air Force Reusable 
Booster Systems are the same questions KSC has lived, breathed  
and labored to understand - for decades. 
 
“the criteria and assumptions used in the formulation of current RBS plans; 
--the methodologies used in the current cost estimates for RBS; 
--the modeling methodology used to frame the business case for an RBS 
capability including: 
--the data used in the analysis, 
--the models’ robustness if new data become available, and 
--the impact of unclassified government data that was previously 
unavailable and which will be supplied by the USAF; 
--the technical maturity of key elements critical to RBS implementation 
and the ability of current technology development plans to meet 
technical readiness milestones.” 
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Productivity (Flight Rate) ═ Growth 
 
• Flight rate does not cure, solve or otherwise make a reusable vehicles business 
case. It is “why” –because we seek to grow an industry or capability, not “how”. 
 
• How to frame a business case for any Reusable Booster System is a question 
interchangeable with: 
• How do we wish to grow the number of US space launches per year, and the space 
launch industry that provides these? 
 
• If we assume an ever increasing growth in our desires for mission capability, and budget 
growth unlikely to ever match that growth in our ambitions – then, Productivity is key. 
 
• Traditional thinking uses flight rate to justify reusability.   
• Reusability will be justified assuming a desire to go beyond the limits of improvements 
possible with only expendables. 
• Flight rate demand – separate from flight rate capability, potential supply – can 
encourage, or drive, the creation of low cost, more responsive systems, but 
responsive, low cost systems are not caused by high flight rates. (More ahead). 
• Responsive, high flight rate, or surge capable systems, at lower cost, are a supply-side 
result, caused by improved vehicle, organization and infrastructure, by design. 
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Productivity and Costs (Price) Are Inseparable 
 
• Most aerospace space transportation costs are contractor costs. 
• R&D, development, production or operations (ground or flight) 
• Shuttle, ELV and other historical data 
• Most contractor costs are indirect costs, far away from a vehicle, 
facility, far from the touch, close-in effort at hardware/software. 
• Direct productive effort and their costs are the tip of the iceberg. 
Visible, closer to hardware/software 
Less visible, farther away from the 
flight/ground/production/development of flight 
hardware/software/infrastructure 
 
These indirect costs dampen demand, which 
favors a supply, a flight rate, at current levels. 
Life According to Aerospace 
…ref. “the methodologies used in the current cost 
estimates for RBS”…and “the data used in the analysis” 
Direct 
Indirect $ 
Configuration Control 
Document Generation 
Scheduling 
Requirements Management 
Logistics 
Engineering 
Safety 
Quality 
V&V 
Suppliers 
Subcontracts 
Business Ops/Internal Facing 
Work Control 
Management 
Contractor 
Government 
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Technology is not just Technical  
 
• Worthwhile cost estimates include methodologies that explore the 
attributes of efficiency of the performing organization (indirect), 
process and practices, fixed costs, and their supply chain 
management (SCM), moving materials and information. 
• What is different in process/practices (P/p) and SCM technologies? 
What is their connection to lower costs vs. historical data? 
 
Technology is the making, usage, and 
knowledge of tools, machines, techniques, 
crafts, systems or methods of organization in 
order to solve a problem or perform a 
specific function. It can also refer to the 
collection of such tools, machinery, and 
procedures.  
…ref. “the methodologies used in the current cost 
estimates for RBS”…and “the data used in the analysis” 
Improvements in COST at same productivity 
Direct 
Indirect $ 
Configuration Control 
Document Generation 
Scheduling 
Requirements Management 
Logistics 
Engineering 
Safety 
Quality 
V&V 
Suppliers 
Subcontracts 
Business Ops/Internal Facing 
Work Control 
Management 
Contractor 
Government Improvements – 
Costs Eliminated 
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Productivity → Costs → Technology 
 
• Once affordability is achieved, efficient organizations can take 
advantage of enabling “technology” for improving their “direct” 
effort/effectiveness, producing MORE flights, responsiveness, a 
HIGHER tempo of operations or other unique product/services. 
• Now the system can scale. Flight rate, sustainability, 
responsiveness, and industry revenue/growth can follow causally. 
-more electric vehicle, EHA’s, EMA’s 
-non-toxic, higher Isp, more maintainable 
propulsion 
-health management 
-automated umbilical's and handling 
-simpler propulsion, ceramic NFS engine parts 
-materials advances , composites, aluminum 
lithium…more. 
…ref. “the methodologies used in the current cost 
estimates for RBS”…and “the data used in the analysis” 
Then TECHNOLOGY  for greater  productivity 
Direct 
Indirect $ 
Configuration Control 
Document Generation 
Scheduling 
Requirements Management 
Logistics 
Engineering 
Safety 
Quality 
V&V 
Suppliers 
Subcontracts 
Business Ops/Internal Facing 
Work Control 
Management 
Contractor 
Government Improvements – 
in Flight Rate 
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Investment Choices (R&D) Connecting Productivity (why) to Costs 
(how) and Technology (what) are about Supply 
 
• Most of the insights about improving life cycle costs could apply to 
expendable systems as well as reusable systems. 
 
• For expendables, promising confirmation of these insights can be 
found in the Space-X Falcon 9 developments. 
• Cost of Falcon 9 development, initial production and test flight 
(not recurring operations) has been 1,2confirmed by 
government analyst to have been between 10% to 32% of 
what government models would otherwise have required. 
 
• KSC “iceberg” data and later models would have confirmed this 
promise and the viability of these connections over a decade ago. 
(1) PUBLIC: Commercial Market Assessment for Crew and Cargo Systems, Pursuant to Section 403 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 
111-267), Appendix B, April 27, 2011. Available at 
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/543572main_Section%20403%28b%29%20Commercial%20Market%20Assessment%20Report%20Final.pdf  
(2) PUBLIC: Falcon 9 Launch Vehicle NAFCOM Cost Estimates, NASA Associate Deputy Administrator for Policy, August 2011. Available at: 
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/586023main_8-3-11_NAFCOM.pdf 
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Investment Choices (R&D) Connecting Productivity (why) to Costs 
(how) and Technology (what) are about Supply 
 
• Advancing hybrid RBS systems means applying the previous 
knowledge to both expendable and reusable components, their 
infrastructure and organizations, and planning for acquisitions. 
 
• As confirmed in many analysis - an eventual direction toward full 
or greater reusability occurs as the cost advantage or “ROI” of 
reusing elements in operations, even at higher one-time 
development or production costs, is more advantageous than the 
cost of manufacturing expendable elements for each launch. 
• Albeit - most such past analysis by industry et al, including 
assumptions, causal links, drivers, or absolute values require 
much improvement to become a rigorous basis of estimates. 
• KSC is now assisting AFRL in life cycle costing of RBS. 
…ref. “the methodologies used in the current cost 
estimates for RBS”…and “the data used in the analysis” 
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Productivity (why) → Costs (how) → Technology (what) → Supply → 
Demand (who) 
 
• Supply must meet with demand. esp. given what may be an 
inelastic market as currently structured. 
 
• Flight rate capable systems of the type envisioned for Air Force 
Reusable Booster Systems would have one type of demand, the 
DoD customer seeking responsive access to space et al (at some 
acceptable cost, relative to other choices, budget available, etc). 
 
• In making the case for a reusable vs. expendable system, total cost 
of ownership, the result of assuming just a single user, may 
preclude justifying the desired capability (responsiveness, et al). 
• To address this, new business models, including commercial, 
must inform RBS business case analysis. 
Back 
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Productivity (why) → Costs (how) → Technology (what) → Supply → 
Demand (who) 
• Demand/flight rate can encourage supply/low cost. 
• Assuming a competitive environment. 
• Assuming a scalable system in the first place. 
• Not as a cause, but as an incentive. 
• Responsive, high flight rate, or surge capable 
systems, at lower cost, are a supply-side result, 
caused by improved vehicle, organization and 
infrastructure, by design. 
 
• Relationships here are also about the “net” sum 
behavior of industry players in such an environment. 
• Poor players would not manifest the pronounced 
curve, instead being relatively flat; these would 
be eliminated by players with better curves as 
these meet supply.  
• The relationship curve over time becomes a 
“net” industry effect, a sum over providers. 
Notional - such a flight rate to cost 
relationship may bear on “the criteria 
and assumptions used in the formulation 
of current RBS plans” …as the case for an 
AF  RBS matures. 
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Productivity (why) → Costs (how) → Technology (what) → Supply → 
Demand (who) 
 
• RBS costs analysis should explore amortizing ownership costs 
through other business case development 
• e.g., Commercial – other uses left to the private sector to 
decide and develop as business cases 
• e.g., Propellant depots – as an example of other government 
demand stimulus (NASA, exploration) 
• e.g., New industry models/structures – operators independent 
of manufacturers (re. Backup 1, 2, 3) 
 
• Current KSC support to the AF RBS is strengthened and informed 
by: 
• These factors integrated into life cycle consideration 
• Previous such attempts (that failed), such as the lessons of 
commercial factors in the EELV program in the 1990’s 
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Risk and Uncertainty 
 
• Based on our collaboration with AFRL, the “technical maturity of 
key elements critical to RBS implementation” are being addressed 
through technology development, testing, and plans for 
pathfinders and demonstrators. 
• Enlisting KSC experience to develop a rigorous foundation for: 
• Understanding industry costs and implications for an RBS 
• Where improvements are required 
• Defining actions where improvements are required and 
their link to productive, responsive, operational systems 
• The link between far term operational systems and near 
term actions for improvement in R&D, demonstration, 
development, production 
…ref. “the technical maturity of key elements 
critical to RBS implementation…” 
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Risk and Uncertainty 
 
• Risks to further address include: 
• Industry / industrial base capability to “show up”, to improve 
on costs, to implement the aforementioned knowledge via 
specific new ways of doing business (NWODB). 
• Then, our understanding in acquisition of a 
companies/industry readiness to execute known, details of 
NWODB (addressing cost and schedule) and  technology 
(addressing outcomes, esp. responsiveness). 
• Confidence. 
 
• RBS business model definition – encouraging competition, a 
commercial aspect, and other aforementioned strategies. 
…ref. “the technical maturity of key elements 
critical to RBS implementation…” 
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Risk and Reliability 
 
• The responsiveness and reliability of an RBS system are a whole. 
• Volume of production enables learning, expendable element 
especially, but also reusable element and system 
infrastructure. 
• A design / organization geared for responsiveness, which also 
meets programmatic / cost goals, enables more flights within 
any resource constraints. More flights, more learning, equals 
more reliability as system improvements are integrated. 
• Reliability on the ground, from production through to 
servicing, and preparations for flight, is inseparable from 
mission reliability, in flight. 
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Summary 1 of 2 
 
• The knowledge and experience exists with which the AF RBS 
program can succeed, meeting objectives for their desired  
combination of responsiveness and cost. 
 
• Low-hanging fruit is abundant at the programmatic level. 
• Risks are in scaling, acquisition and maintaining the 
connections between actions at the design and organizational 
level and program objectives. 
 
• Challenges are in productivity, realizing the full advantage of the 
reusability and enabling technologies in the initial hybrid system. 
 
• KSC collaboration with AFRL RBS is communicating these same 
themes in detail, supporting their quantitative analysis and 
qualitative understanding for integration into program planning. 
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Summary 2 of 2 
 
• The AF RBS planning is on target with pathfinder / demonstrators, 
flight tests, test-beds, and operability ground experiments. 
• At a fidelity reflecting on (1) flight segment effectiveness 
(flyback, deploy) and/or (2) ground segment effectiveness 
(responsiveness, cost, reliability, maintainability, the “-ilities”)  
 
“…learning through doing…” 
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Recommendations 
 
• Recommend continuing the rigorous connection of actions 
to costs to productivity  in RBS life cycle planning with a firm 
basis in experience, data, and knowledge to mature the 
definitive case for Reusable Booster Systems. 
 
• Risks in business models, especially competition as a factor, 
and industry’s ability to transform programmatically, must 
inform the  measures of possible outcomes 
• Outcomes - achieving combinations of responsiveness 
and cost. 
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Questions? 
27 
Backup 
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Growth, Flight Rate and Productivity vs. Paths 
 
• 1Disruptive innovation path 
• A new product or technology of inferior performance to existing 
product lines nonetheless meets a demand. 
• New markets arise. 
• Eventually the new market defined by this supply/demand disrupts 
the existing market, achieving and exceeding past performance. 
• Maturation path 
• Productivity advances define investments. 
• e.g., new trains, oil rather than coal, each cost more up-front, and 
each cost more to operate, per year. 
• The investment is favorable through the metric of greater 
productivity: The number of passengers that can be served with the 
investment increases, increasing total yearly revenue, even as per 
passenger mile costs (and prices) drop, which further encourages 
demand. 
• Assumes growth of the total demand is possible. 
1. “The Innovators Dilemma” available at http://www.businessweek.com/chapter/christensen.htm  
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Cautionary Observations on Life Cycle Costing 
 
• Beware cost estimates where there is ANY cost as an input. 
• Understand the limits of such analysis when costs are inputs. 
• Useful in “what-if’s”. 
• These are more fairly called “calculations”, or the integrating of 
information, but are not true “estimates”. 
• Garbage in, garbage out. 
 
• Rigorous life cycle cost estimation and business case development 
is characterized by defining actions as causes of costs. 
• Cost is an output of actions. 
• Actions by design, both technical (flight technology, ground 
systems, vehicle design) and non-technical (organizational 
technology, processes, practices, and business approaches). 
• Demand should be an element met or not by these actionable 
scenarios, not a cure for poor design. 
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Industry Operators Independent of Manufacturers 1 of 3 
 
“Vertical integration does not appear to be a systemic problem today but warrants 
caution. 
 
The Task Force found little evidence that vertical integration is creating systemic 
problems for DoD products today.  A few vertical concerns have been identified and 
remedied in defense merger and acquisition reviews.  In existing DoD acquisition 
programs, firms are less likely to use newly acquired vertical businesses to replace 
current suppliers because of the cost and risk of switching suppliers. 
 
However, the Task Force believes vertical integration poses future concern to DoD.  
Many industry mergers and acquisitions are very recent, and all of their effects 
cannot yet be assessed.  The concentrated defense industry and few new DoD 
program opportunities create a potentially static business environment.” 
 
Defense Science Board Task Force on Vertical Integration and Supplier Decisions, 
May 1997, Office of the Secretary of Defense 
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Industry Operators Independent of Manufacturers 2 of 3 
 
“Independent Space Transportation Operator Concept, A 
Breakthrough Acquisition Strategy Using Independent Space 
Transportation Operators, Making Affordable and Sustainable Space 
Transportation Possible”, C. McCleskey, NASA John F. Kennedy Space 
Center, Florida, May 18, 2004, publicly available at: 
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/Nexgen_Downloads/On_the_Need_for_Independent_Operators.pdf  
32 
Industry Operators Independent of Manufacturers 3 of 3 
 
“I have been on the ground side for 30 years and realistically when you get a program the major 
emphasis is typically on hardware which is something people can touch, see and identify with. 
We’re in a situation where typically the ground is treated as a key component but not at the 
same priority as space hardware – it doesn’t have the glamour. 
  
The space system can’t work without a solid, effective ground system that makes sure data gets 
to the right place at the right time. 
  
I think the hesitation [at going this route] is because it’s something that hasn’t been done 
before. There are some arguments that you can get better integration between the ground 
segment and the spacecraft by procuring them together, but I don’t believe our systems can 
be operated in a stovepipe kind of mode. You need to be able to have interoperability across 
these systems. The viable place to do that is on the ground where all the pieces come 
together.” 
 
Raymond L. Kolibaba, Vice President for Space Systems,  
Raytheon Intelligence and Information Systems 
Space News, September 26, 2005 
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KSC 
Master 
Planning 
and the 
AF RBS 
 
Public at: 
http://www.nasa.gov
/centers/kennedy/pdf
/634026main_future-
concept.pdf  
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Technology and Operability 
 
• 1997: “A Guide for the Design of Highly Reusable Space 
Transportation”, publicly available at: 
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/hrst_main.htm  
 
TOP 20 DESIGN FEATURES
Figure 1:  Prioritized Measurable Criteria
SCORE
# of parts (different, backup, complex) (-)
# of systems requiring monitoring due to hazards (-) 
Mass Fraction (+)
# of different fluids in system (-)
Technology readiness levels (+)
# of active components req’d to function including flight ops (-)
# of hands on activities req’d (-)
% of propulsion system automated (+)
# of active systems required to maintain a safe vehicle (-)
# of potential leakage / connection sources (-)
# of components with demonstrated high reliability (+)
# of purges required (flight and ground) (-)
# of active ground systems required for servicing (-)
# of unique stages (flight and ground) (-)
# of different propulsion systems (-)
Hours for turnaround (between launches) (-)
# of confined spaces on vehicles (-)
# of systems with BIT BITE (+)
System margin (+)
# of toxic fluids (-)
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
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